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bstract. The paper aims to provide a panoramic view of the dynamics of 
tax evasion in Romania, reflected in terms of fiscal inspection activities. 
The author used the official data published by the institutions with 
attributions on the line of identification and fighting against tax evasion 
(National Agency of Fiscal Administration and Financial Guard) with the view to 
reflect the real situation concerning the number of inspections, quantify and 
sanction tax evasion for 2003-2008 periods. Although the number of fiscal 
inspections and the number of tax payers who have violated the rules of fiscal 
discipline decreased compared with 2003, the frequency of tax evasion 
remained. At the same time, based on the data referring to the level and 
dynamics of the tax dodger phenomenon appreciations have been made 
regarding the fiscal discipline of the Romanian tax payer and to the attitude of 
the qualified institutions in discovering and sanctioning the fraudulent tax 
evasion. In this respect, the author observed that the level of willingness of tax 
legislation in relation to the Romanian tax payer has not changed considerably. 
The level of identified tax evasion reported to real GDP increased slightly. This 
situation can be interpreted as a success of institutions in charge of identification 
and fighting of tax evasion, a result of the increase of fiscal inspection number 
and detection probability, but also a result of GDP growth at a rate lower than the 
identified tax evasion. The author has also tried to find a causality relation 
between the option for tax evasion and corruption. The author found that a 
corrupt environment facilitates the decision to evade depending on detection 
probability, penalty system and bribery level as discouraging factors for tax 
evasion. The level of identified tax evasion is smaller than the real level of entire 
tax evasion, an important part being impossible to determine because of 
corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
In post-revolutionary Romania, tax payers consider evasion as a true virtue, an 
attribute of an intelligent evil that offer the possibility to protect the property and 
monetary interests of the individual escapist regardless of social status and its 
financial position. To a lesser or greater extent, all countries face this problem. 
Government measures aim essentially to limit it as much as possible. The 
eradication is practically impossible.      
The legislative, economic and social situation has made the proliferation of tax 
evasion phenomenon possible. This is an important part of underground 
economy and it is ubiquitous in all areas of income generating activities. Taxation 
stimulates the Romanian tax payer’s ingenuity determining him to seek and 
apply different procedures in order to circumvent the law. Romania has also 
created the necessary and sufficient conditions for tax evasion: instability of tax 
legislation, inconsistencies and legislative gaps, useless law concerning tax 
evasion, bureaucratic corruption, but also the existence of a higher fiscal 
pressure, an unequal relation between taxation and taxpayer real capacity to pay 
tax obligations.    
2. Observations on data processing and interpretation of 
results obtained 
The author focused the study on the dynamics of identified tax evasion (fiscal 
fraud) based on data records of institutions in charge of identification and fighting 
of tax evasion. 
The management of taxes, contributions and other amounts owed to the general 
consolidated budget is the responsibility of the Romanian National Agency of 
Fiscal Administration, subordinated to the Ministry of Finance. That Agency has 
a number of bodies concerned with financial control, taxation and customs, 
namely the Financial Guard, the National Customs Authority, General 
Directorates of Public Finance, Department of Large Taxpayers and also the 
General Directorate of Fiscal Inspection Coordination. These structures carry out C.-M. Ene 
 
148
the operational and unannounced control with the purpose of preventing, 
detecting and combating any acts and facts of economic, financial and customs 
nature that may generate fiscal evasion.  
Studies and reports issued by the financial and fiscal control institutions are the 
result of individual inspections and are focused on the particular mechanisms 
and cases of fiscal fraud without properly addressing the fiscal policy measures 
to deal with problems effectively and on a long term. However, it should be noted 
that removal of a cause will not necessarily eliminate the effect. 
Public data concerning the number of inspections made by qualified institutions 
in discovering and sanctioning the fraudulent tax evasion and their results 
provide an overview of the tax evasion phenomenon in the period 2003-2008 
(Table 1), but also offer some considerations regarding those bodies’ attitude.  
 
Table 1 
Evolution of tax evasion in Romania (2003-2008) 
Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
Number  
of 
inspections 
Number 
of  
identified 
tax 
evasion 
cases 
Share of tax 
evasion 
cases in the 
total 
number of 
inspections 
(%) 
The total 
amount of 
identified 
tax 
evasion 
(thousand 
lei) 
The total 
amount of 
penalties 
imposed 
(thousand 
lei) 
The total 
amount 
additionally 
incurred 
(thousand 
lei) 
Share of 
identified 
tax 
evasion 
in GDP 
(%) 
2003  446822 195425  43.74  798900  1804700  2603600  0.405 
2004  273020 120077  43.98  982350  1984522  2966872  0.397 
2005  286903 115158  40.14  1746304  1137326  2883630  0.600 
2006  252719 114750  45.41  1513000  2417000  3930000  0.440 
2007  276853 108786  39.29  1828000  3039000  4867000  0.443 
2008  287280 134970  46.98  3859000  5586000  9445000  0.770 
Note: The total amount of penalties imposed include the penalties, fines, but also the 
properties and money sequestrated. 
Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by the 
institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion. 
 
In spite of the decrease in number of inspections and taxpayers who have 
violated the rules of financial and fiscal discipline (compared to 2003, Figure 1), 
the frequency of tax evasion maintained on an average of 43% for the analised 
period.  Tax Evasion Dynamics in Romania 
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Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion. 
Figure 1. Number of fiscal inspections and number  
of identified tax evasion cases 
 
Therefore, one can conclude that the degree of voluntary fiscal conformity of the 
Romanian taxpayer did not change considerably in the period 2003-2008 even if 
the number of tax evasion activities slightly increased from 2007 to 2008. In 2008 
the number of escapists grew by nearly 8 percentage points compared to the 
previous year and 3 percentage points since 2003. In 2003 the fiscal inspectors 
discovered 44 tax evasion cases in 100 inspections. Lately, this number arises to 
46 (in 2006) and 47 (in 2008), as you can see in Figure 2. All these facts make me 
think that almost half of Romanian taxpayers are using various ways and methods 
to avoid entirely or in part to make the payment of fiscal obligations.  
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Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion and own 
calculations. 
Figure 2. The number of escapists found in 100 fiscal inspections C.-M. Ene 
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The share of identified tax evasion in the official GDP and the share of identified 
tax evasion in the tax revenues of consolidated budget, but also the actual 
capacity of tax evasion to finance the budget deficit are shown in the Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
The share of tax evasion in the state revenues 
- Million lei -  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
The total amount of 
identified tax evasion  798.9  982.35  1746.304  1513  1828  3859 
Total amounts additional 
incurred 2603.6  2966.872  2883.63  3930  4867  9445 
GDP 197427.6  247368  288954.6  344650.6  412761.5  503958.7 
Fiscal revenues of state 
consolidated  budget  53564.9 67623.6 79032.3 96773.8  115209 142464 
The state budget deficit  2900.4  1878.1  2182.9  10537.5  15388.9  26205.9 
Share of identified tax 
evasion in GDP (%)  0.40  0.40  0.60  0.44  0.44  0.77 
The share of identified 
tax evasion in fiscal 
revenues of state 
consolidated budget (%)  1.49  1.45  2.21  1.56  1.59  2.71 
The share of additional 
incurred amounts in 
state budget deficit (%)  89.77  157.97  132.10  37.30  31.63  36.04 
Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion and own 
calculations. 
 
 
The share of identified tax evasion in GDP increased slightly from 0.4% in 2003 
to 0.77% in 2008. This increase should be interpreted as a success of the 
qualified institutions in discovering and sanctioning the fraudulent tax evasion. 
They increased the number of fiscal inspections and at the same time they 
improved the probability to discover the activities of tax evasion nature. On the 
other hand, this is not a spectacular result because GDP grows at lower rates 
than the identified tax evasion. The share of identified tax evasion in general 
consolidated state budget revenues increased from 1.49% in 2003 to 2.71 in 
2008.  Tax Evasion Dynamics in Romania 
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Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion and own 
calculations. 
Figure 3. Identified tax evasion, GDP and fiscal revenues 
 
Concerning the capacity of financing the budget deficit, it is worth noting that the 
action to identify activities of tax evasion nature may be an effective way to 
reduce the budget deficit. The question is if the state is capable to receive 
effectively these amounts to the budget because this is a problem in Romania. 
Even now, the Romanian tax system proves to be very weak and the amounts 
have been collected at a very low level. Fiscal authorities should intervene in this 
way and should ensure the best possible collection of amounts generated by 
identified tax evasion. Higher voluntary fiscal compliance is essential for the 
proper collection of budget revenues and therefore that must be one of the major 
objectives of tax administration. To prove the statements the author indicates the 
data presented in Table 3. 
Furthermore, it should be also noted that not all identified tax evasion amounts 
are certain. Almost all fiscal acts can be contested and such disputes involve a 
trial or adjudication in various legal courts. These situations delay the fiscal 
authorities’ acts and additional amounts cannot be recorded as debts in tax 
records since a final and irrevocable sentence. This should take months or 
years.  
 C.-M. Ene 
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Table 3  
Situation of fine amounts collection determined by Financial Guard 
- Thousands lei - 
Indicator / Years  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Criminal complaints  1720 2009 2334  2375  4391 
Fines set  108000 162000 193000  273000  251000 
Fines collected  89000 122000 139000  178000  156000 
Share of fines collected in fines 
set (%)  82,41 75,31 72,02  65,20  62,15 
Confiscations*  154000 124000  89000  104000  131000 
Damages**  362000 697000 746000 1400000 2194000 
* The indicator “Confiscations” does not cover the value of unavailable goods that are subject 
to criminal complaints, cigarettes, alcohol and all goods that must be destroyed under the 
legal provisions.  
** The damages are discovered by the Financial Guard exclusively and do not include losses 
related to this institution’s activity upon notification of a criminal police investigation. 
Source: Financial Guard – Report on control activities in 2008. 
 
The analysis of the taxpayer’s voluntary compliance requires an investigation of 
the amounts that the Romanian fraudsters have wheedled from public budget 
and the average value of these damages (Table 4). 
Table 4 
Indicators of fiscal evasion in Romania during 2003 - 2008 
Indicators 
 
Years 
Number of identified 
tax evasion cases 
Total amount of tax 
evasion* 
 (thousand lei) 
Average value of 
tax evasion* 
 (lei) 
2003  195425 798900  4088.01 
2004  120077 982350  8181.00 
2005  115158 1511952  13129.37 
2006  114750 1167519  10174.46 
2007  108786 1275399  11723.93 
2008  134970 2389026  17700.42 
Note: * Data are expressed in constant prices; 2003 is considered the base year. 
Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion and own 
calculations.  Tax Evasion Dynamics in Romania 
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Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge of identification and fighting of tax evasion and own 
calculations. 
Figure 4. The average size of identified tax  
evasion discovered to an escapist 
 
The data indicate that an escapist won an average amount of 4088 lei in 2003. In 
2005 the amount tripled, reaching 13129 lei. A significant increase is revealed in 
2008 when the average amount of identified tax evasion was 17700 lei 
representing an increase of over 300% compared to 2003 and 35% compared to 
2005, when its level was also high. The data are expressed in constant prices 
(2003 is considered the base year). As the figure suggests, the “progress” made 
is actually a continuous degradation of the Romanian taxpayer’s compliance. 
The penalties imposed by fiscal authorities follow the upward trend of identified 
tax evasion. They have a significant value in the last year (Table 5). 
 C.-M. Ene 
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Table 5 
Sanctions on identified tax evasion 
    The total 
amount of 
tax evasion 
 (thousand 
lei) 
Absolute 
change in 
identified tax 
evasion value 
(thousand lei) 
Relative 
change in 
identified tax 
evasion value 
 (%) 
The total 
amount of 
sanctions 
 (thousand 
lei) 
Penalty 
rate 
(%) 
Penalty 
value 
variation 
(%) 
2003  798900 -  -  1804700  225.90  - 
2004  982350 183450.0  +22.96  1984522  202.02  +9.96 
2005  1511952 529601.5  +53.91 984698  65.13  -50.38 
2006  1167519 -344432.0  -22.78  1865099  159.75  +89.41 
2007  1275399 107880.1  +9.24  2120317  166.25  +13.68 
2008  2389026 1113627.0  +87.32 3458176  144.75  +63.10 
Source: National Agency of Fiscal Administration – Information on the results achieved by 
the institutions in charge  of identification and fighting of tax evasion and own 
calculations. 
 
The penalty rate decreased in 2008 compared to the previous year and tends to 
represent almost 50% less than the penalties imposed in 2003. The minimum level 
of this rate was recorded in 2005, but the reduction trend is obvious. The 
explanation of this behavior can be found by comparing the annual variation in the 
identified tax evasion and penalty rate. 2004, 2007 and 2008 are the best years, 
when the fiscal controllers had a balanced behavior towards fraudsters. The 
positive change in the identified tax evasion value was followed by a similar change 
in the value of sanctions imposed. Instead, 2005 is the year when problems 
worsened. Tax evasion recorded an increase of 54% compared to the previous 
year and fiscal inspectors responded with a relative decrease of sanctions. Only 
corruption can offer a logical explanation of this attitude. Revenge came in 2006 
when the reduction in identified tax evasion value was followed by an excessive 
growth in penalties (89.41% compared to the previous year). The author thinks that 
an attitude and a behavior like this encouraged corruption.        
Corruption level is symptomatic for economic, political and social development. It 
damages citizens’ ethics and moral and undermine public confidence in the rule of 
law. We are faced with corruption penetration in various areas that should usually 
support national economic development. More and more companies are pushed 
into underground economy. The immediate effect of this situation results in a 
vicious circle. Endemic corruption weakens the investments, public revenues and 
the state credibility. Also, it generates negative effects on economic growth using 
inefficient and irrational transactions, alters capital accumulation, productivity, 
government revenues and quality of public infrastructure.  Tax Evasion Dynamics in Romania 
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In our country, the measures to combat corruption occur when one has already 
broken legal rules, but the consequences are not very serious, having potential to 
generate corruption rather than to represent a corruption act itself (administrative 
inspections, audit work, control bodies, etc.). The sanctions or penalties occur 
when the corruption acts have been proved, the consequences have been found 
and the guilty person(s) are subjects to criminal complaints. This is the only way to 
avoid perpetuating these acts and to provide a model for the rest of the society. 
Corruption is nowadays reality. The wide corruption proliferation and the lack of 
sanctions are strongly felt by ordinary people. This situation is revealed by the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)1 (Figure 5).  
The scale of CPI grows from 0 (extremely corrupt) to 10 (very clean). A small 
Index means a great level of corruption perception. Comparing CPI in European 
Union countries and Romania it can be seen that our country has the lower level 
of this Index (Figure 6). 
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Source: Transparency International Romania – National Report on Corruption (2008) 
Figure 5. Corruption Perception Index (1997-2008) 
                                                 
1 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a compound index, based on the data obtained from 
specialized surveys implemented by several independent renowned institutions. The surveys 
used for the calculation of the CPI contain questions regarding the incorrect use of public 
function for personal gain, such as situations in which public officials take bribe in connection 
with public acquisitions, or situations in which public funds are dilapidated. Other questions 
verify the efficiency of anticorruption policies, which verifies political as well as administrative 
corruption. The results of the CPI allow the classification of countries based on the levels of 
perception regarding corruption among public officials and politicians. The score obtained by 
each country is highly relevant for the level of perceived corruption; the position of individual 
countries in the classification varies each year, with the exclusion of old countries or the 
inclusion of new ones. The Corruption Perception Index is annually calculated and launched 
simultaneously by Transparency International headquarters and its national branches. C.-M. Ene 
 
156
7,19
3,44
6,67
3
6,53
3,3
6,5
2,9
6,49
2,8
6,51
2,6
6,57
2,8
6,58
2,9
6,66
3
6,74
3,1
6,72
3,7
6,62
3,8
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CPI for EU countries (average value) CPI for Romania
 
Source: Transparency International Romania – National Report on Corruption (2008) 
Figure 6. Corruption Perception Index (1997-2008) in Romania and EU countries 
 
Having a general corrupt environment and assuming a general income tax of 
16% (for the entire period 2003-2008) and a bribe value (m) equal to 50% from 
taxes and penalties owed in normal condition of taxpayers’ voluntary compliance 
we can estimate the average earnings of an escapists (comparing with a safe 
income) and the impact that corruption exerted on the process of identifying tax 
evasion. I determined the share of identified tax evasion in total earnings 
generated by a circumvention strategy (Table 6). 
Table 6 
Share of identified tax evasion in total tax evasion 
Indicators 
 
 
 
Years 
Identified 
tax evasion 
(thousand 
lei) 
Average amount 
results from a 
circumvention 
strategy (thousand
lei) m=50% 
Share of identified tax 
evasion in average 
amount results from 
a circumvention 
strategy (%) 
Tax evasion 
covered by 
corruption  
(%) 
2003  798900.00 1794014.73  44.53  55.47 
2004  982350.00 2455330.00  40.01  59.99 
2005  1511951.52 2382997.24  63.45  36.55 
2006  1167519.35 2466029.20  47.34  52.66 
2007  1275399.44 2721471.30  46.86  53.14 
2008  2389026.10 2614392.10  91.38  8.62 
Average value  (2003 – 2008)  44.40 
Note: “m” represents bribe value. The author supposed that bribe value is equal to 50% from 
taxes and penalties owed in normal conditions of taxpayer’s voluntary compliance. 
Source: Own calculations.  Tax Evasion Dynamics in Romania 
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The calculation shows that less than half of the tax evasion is discovered 
because about 44% is protected by official corruption. The author assumes that 
the model is subjective and involves some assumptions and conditions, but it 
offers a causality relation between the option for tax evasion and corruption. The 
author found that a corrupt environment facilitates the decision to evade 
depending on detection probability, penalty system and bribery level as a 
discouraging factors for tax evasion. The level of identified tax evasion is smaller 
than the real level of entire tax evasion, an important part being impossible to 
determine because of corruption. Each monetary unit paid in the corruption area 
requires its recovery together with an illicit advantage, higher than legal earnings. 
As a result, corruption becomes one of the main causes of underground 
economy growth, generating a multiplier effect on the level of the fraud.    
3. Conclusions 
The data analysis reveals that the most consistent tax evasion occurs in value 
added tax (VAT). As VAT has a very important contribution to the state budget 
revenues, I might say that tax evasion has a significant effect on the ability to 
finance public spending. There are some areas where fraud is more frequent 
such as building construction and civil engineering works, manufactures, retail 
trade in specialized stores, etc.  
Studies and reports issued by the financial and fiscal control institutions are the 
result of individual inspections and are focused on the particular mechanisms 
and cases of fiscal fraud without properly addressing the fiscal policy measures 
designed to deal with problems effectively and on a long term. However, it 
should be noted that removal of a cause will not necessarily eliminate the effect. 
The action to identify activities of tax evasion nature may be an effective way to 
reduce the budget deficit. The question is whether the state is capable to collect 
effectively these amounts to the budget because this is a problem in Romania. 
Even now, the Romanian tax system proved to be very weak and the amounts 
have been receipted at a very low level. Fiscal authorities should intervene in this 
way and should ensure the best possible collection of amounts generated by 
identified tax evasion. 
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